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Proud Prophet was a real-time national-command-level war game played in the United States in the midst of the Cold War, starting on during June 13, 1983. Its intent was to test out various proposals and strategies for possible nuclear war, which had been proposed in response to the Soviet Union's military buildup. These strategies varied from demonstration nuclear attacks to limited nuclear war to decapitation attacks. President Ronald Reagan and his administration were faced with the problem of figuring out which strategy would be most effective and how the United States should plan to respond to the Soviet Union's new and larger nuclear capability.
The war game (like nuclear war games in general) was made necessary by the need to "Herman Kahn" by running through scenarios and planning appropriate responses to opposing nuclear strikes. The game simulated conflict in a number of regions, from East Asia to Europe and in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It involved more than 200 military and other personnel and ran for twelve simulated days, stretched over seven weeks of calendar time. The players were forced to make critical strategic and diplomatic decisions to test the effectiveness of the United States mobilization and war plans. Because of the heightened tensions of the ongoing Cold War, this simulation was made the most realistic in United States military history. For the first time ever, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff took part in the game, although their participation was concealed. One of the main purposes of the simulation was to test the response of the National Command Authority's (NCA) decision making when dealing with many different situations at once.
The course of the game provided a sobering and terrifying example of how nuclear strikes intended to be limited could quickly escalate to a civilizational catastrophe. In the game, the NATO forces found themselves hard-pressed by Soviet biological, chemical, and conventional attacks. To save the situation the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of 11 low-yield nuclear artillery shells near the front line. The Soviet player responded in kind. Over several days the nuclear strikes became larger, more numerous, and deeper. A simulated hotline between the opponents was used to explain the limited intention behind nuclear attacks, but the messages were not believed. Some of the players became emotionally involved. By the seventh simulated day of nuclear operations, every major German and Polish city was destroyed, along with Paris, London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Brussels. Hundreds of nuclear attacks had been made in Europe and around the world. Half a billion people would have been killed in these nuclear strikes, and many more would have died from radiation and starvation in the aftermath. Large areas of the world would have been made uninhabitable for decades.
The shocking result of Proud Prophet seemed to show that a nuclear strike intended to be limited might not be perceived that way by the other side, leading to escalation spiraling out of control. After the wargame, the concept of managing or controlling nuclear escalation fell out of favor at the policy-making levels of the US Government, as did a number of more aggressive ideas about the use of nuclear weapons. Attention turned instead to a buildup of conventional military forces, readiness for a rapid reinforcement of Europe from the United States in case of a Soviet threat, and Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative to develop a way to shield the US and allies from nuclear attack.
The government report for Proud Prophet was not declassified until December 20, 2012, and was only declassified in part.
The multitude of proposed strategies necessitated an evaluation of their feasibility and practicality. There was much debate on this issue, which came to a head when Andrew W. Marshall, the director of net assessment, suggested that a group be set up to help the Secretary of Defense assess the various strategies and explore new options. This group would consist of military officers from each of the armed services, as well as senior civilians and consultants. These individuals would be granted access to the resources that the National War College had to offer, with no military interference. This idea was not very popular with many generals, but it led to the formulation of the Strategic Concepts Development Center (SCDC) at National Defense University. The Secretary of Defense at the time, Caspar Weinberger, brought in Phillip A. Karber as the founding director, asking him to bring in the best and brightest strategists who were not ideological and who represented a broad range of bipartisan views. This operation was done with the utmost confidentiality. Soon afterwards, the suggestion of a war game was brought up.
Soviet nuclear doctrine called for a first strike in order to make a nuclear war technically winnable. This led to a plan for a Launch On Tactical Warning (LOTW) strike by the Soviets. This would launch the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles immediately on any sign of incoming United States missiles via radar or satellite detection. Any misreading of western intentions could have had disastrous consequences. The perception among Soviet military leaders was that the United States would stop at nothing to destroy them, including nuclear annihilation. They believed that nuclear war was imminent, and their fear of a surprise nuclear attack was growing. Project RYAN was not established so the Soviets could strike second; instead, it was to ensure the Soviets had the necessary information in order to strike first.
Despite treaties and economics being used as a means to weaken the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration still had concerns on whether or not the Cold War would escalate to nuclear war. In an attempt to be prepared for the worst, a number of strategies were studied to test all avenues of this war—from peaceful negotiations to mutual Assured Destruction. The administration used techniques such as talks and games to determine the nature of the war and the temperament of the Soviet Union.
Concerned by the growing number of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear armed nations, Reagan became ever more interested in finding a way to rid the world of nuclear threat. This dislike for nuclear weapons, however, extends all the way back to the start of his first term in which, upon the briefing of his different available nuclear strategies he was rendered sick, the meeting having to be rescheduled. 1983 proved to be a very tense year for the Reagan administration as things became unstable with the Soviets while Reagan continued to seek out ways to bring about peace whether or not the solution involved nuclear war.
In June 1983, Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, his chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John William Vessey Jr., as well as dozens of high-ranking military personnel participated in a classified war game known as Proud Prophet which worked in real-time at the National War College. It was not the first of its kind, but did prove to be one of the most beneficial in determining the efficacy of America's nuclear strategy. In this game, they used each of America's nuclear strike tactics which included:
In each of these instances, tested repeatedly and with different factors that would affect outcomes, the results were grim. Outcomes of the least deadly strategy resulted in a base level of half a billion deaths and more to come in the aftermath of a nuclear fallout contaminated and annihilated the northern hemisphere. In response to this information, the Reagan Administration changed their rhetoric and strategies changed, insisting on a permanent prevention of nuclear warfare.
A number of steps were taken to ensure the end of a nuclear threat from the Soviet and American fronts alike. Understanding that, realistically, a threat still existed and in an attempt to protect the United States, Reagan initiated his Strategic Defense Initiative (nicknamed the Star Wars program) as well as more intensive talks to bring about a nuclear freeze. These tensions came to a head when he discussed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Soviet Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev, which helped to reduce some of the nuclear weapons on both of the two opposing sides, slowing the arms race that had been growing at this time.
I feel the Soviets are so defense-minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them, we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What have they got that anyone would want? George is going on ABC right after its big nuclear bomb film Sunday night. It shows why we must keep doing what we're doing.This thought process is directly opposite of what the Soviets believed at the time. Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador at the time, truly believed that the possibility of nuclear war sharply increased in the 1980s. The Soviets truly believed the Reagan administration was headed for war. President Reagan believed that the Soviets were truly afraid of the United States and what they were capable of. Reagan is again quoted in his diary explaining this:
I picked his brains President about the Soviet Union. He was ambassador there for a time. He believes that coupled with their expansionist philosophy, they are also insecure and genuinely frightened of us. He also believes that if we opened them up a bit, their leading citizens would get braver about proposing changes in their system. I'm going to pursue this.It's clear that the United States did not have any intentions of launching a nuclear first strike against the Soviets, but were having a significant amount of trouble communicating this. Project RYAN continued to feed into Soviet fears that the United States was being dishonest, and Able Archer 83 simply fanned the flames.
The Soviets viewed the building up of US forces as an attempt to ‘blackmail’ the Soviet Union into submission. This led the Soviets to “enhance the value of nuclear weapons” as a war fighting weapon. In 1982, the Soviet Union renounced the first use of nuclear weapons, but the declaration did not affect the Soviets war plan, as they still considered a preemptive strike if authentic information was acquired. In March 1979, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitry Ustinov anticipated that NATO would easily be able to enlist the help of China and France, from that he deduced that NATO could be ready for war in as little as 48 hours.
In December 1979, the Warsaw Pact viewed NATO's motives as being driven by their desire to gain military superiority. These views were fueled and supported by the intelligence that was being gathered at the time. In February 1980, the head of the KGB (KGB), Yuri Andropov, raised concern over the “US bid for military superiority”. A meeting in early 1981 between Andropov and Brezhnev resulted in the formation of RYAN (as detailed above), with the intent of gaining enough intelligence to foretell the comings of a nuclear attack.
In 1981, Soviets obtained the war plan for the US 5th Army Corps in Germany which hinted they had the ability to stop the Soviet's forces with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. With this information, the Soviet Union's conventional method of war was being threatened. The chief of the Soviet General Staff, Nikolai Ogarkov, argued that the Soviets could win the war if they were the ones who struck with tactical nuclear weapons first. To counter this view, the defense minister, Dmitrii Ustinov, disapproved of those who believed in winning a nuclear war. Brezhnev also believed that winning a war would be impossible. Colonel Vitalii N. Tsygichko was tasked with illustrating the outcome if nuclear war broke out, and showed that the use of nuclear weapons was not an option.
In contrast to the US, the Soviet generals and marshals were the ones pushing for war, whereas in the US, it was the civilians and politicians. In November 1982, Andropov was appointed to General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) after the death of Brezhnev. Andropov found it hard to distinguish whether or not the United States were intending to blackmail the Soviet Union, or preparing to use nuclear weapons. Andropov placed the blame on the west for the continuing arms race that was sliding down a slope that would ultimately end in war.
In February 1983, the Soviet threat level under RYAN was increased, just after a Warsaw Pact meeting, and the USSR was on high alert for any surprise attacks. On September 26, 1983, in the 'Petrov Incident', Stanislav Petrov was an on-duty officer in a Soviet nuclear warning center, where there was a purported launch of American nuclear missiles. Petrov opted not to alert the Soviet high command because the system malfunctioned, indicating that the Soviets narrowly avoided war.
Ronald Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983, laid out the plan for ‘Star Wars’ which served to infuriate the Soviet Union, with Andropov proclaiming that the United States was continuing their search for more ways to turn a nuclear war in their favor, instead of relying on mutual assured destruction. The Soviet Union was aware of previous NATO training exercises, however not enough intelligence was obtained to prove the harmlessness of the Able Archer 83 exercises, leading to rising tensions.
Another major concern that led to the confidentiality of this game involved the need to prevent a media leakage that could potentially disturb Soviet Union leaders or even leaders from allied countries. During the summer of 1983, relations between the United States and Soviet Union were poor, so President Reagan and his administration had to be very careful of media coverage and avoid negative headlines that could be potentially misinterpreted or misconstrued.
Schelling's previous wartime games like the crisis games at the Rand Corporation in the 1950s and at the US National Security Council in the early 1960s incorporated help from staffers from think tanks, the Pentagon, and the CIA while his new game was designed where only decision-makers like the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could play. Karber had ordered that a "Thucydides Chronicler" independently observe the decision making on both sides of the game's spectrum; they would do so by wandering around the game and recording their impressions.
Played in real-time at the secret facility of the National War College, the game continued for two weeks, around the clock, with most of it taking place in Washington. Many high ranking military officers were in contact with military command posts across the globe via top-secret links playing out the scenarios in East Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe, and the Middle East. With security being of top priority, only a limited number of individuals knew who was actually involved which prevented any kind of media leak.
Every morning, Karber traveled across the Potomac River to the Pentagon or used a red phone to call the secretary and chairman to discuss the scenario being played out. They then talked about what actions needed to be taken by discussing the United States' policy, possible alliance reactions, as well as potential strategic moves that should be taken. These scenarios took place so reaction times could be improved if something were to happen.
During the games, many scenarios were played out, especially the strategies mentioned earlier on, such as launch on warning, which did not make the cut; the idea of leaving a launch decision up to a computer was in no one's best interest. Point blank attacking Moscow also did not make the cut, considering just how many nuclear weapons the Soviets had. They would only strike back. Deploying NATO armies seemed like a good idea before the games, until the US realized that the taking of one piece of land meant they would lose much more than they gained.
Limited nuclear attacks were also abandoned. The Soviets only interpreted the strikes as attacks on their culture and struck back, rather than see that the United States was quite capable of winning and give up. The games had the United States striking back, which resulted in all-out nuclear Armageddon, with more than half a billion people killed, leaving a great part of the northern hemisphere uninhabitable. This strategy scared everyone and was abandoned.
The results of the game were disturbing to all of those involved. Russia, Europe, and the United States were all completely destroyed. Most of the northern hemisphere would now be rendered uninhabitable, and 500 million people would be dead. It was estimated that half a billion people would also die from radiation and starvation in the months to follow the strikes. All of this would happen simply because the Secretary of Defense (Caspar Weinberger) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (John William Vessey Jr.) followed the United States' strategy in place for such an event.
This exercise served to highlight the weaknesses in the United States nuclear strategy. The number of civilian casualties along with the complete destruction of three regions called for a complete revamping of how the United States would handle a situation like this developing. Proud Prophet also completely changed President Reagan's nuclear rhetoric concerning the Soviets. With the knowledge of Proud Prophet in mind, and the absolute catastrophe that nuclear war would bring, President Reagan could reevaluate how he dealt with the Soviets, and focus more on de-escalation rather than nuclear strong-arming.
There were proposed strategies such as launching on warning, which were quickly disposed of. Authorities were not comfortable with the idea of letting computers connected to a radar system, have the ability to launch missiles. Another strategy that did not last long involved attacking Moscow, in hopes of knocking it out as a command center. The Soviets had more than 30,000 nuclear weapons. It was felt that they would find a way to retaliate against the United States.
There was the impression that sending NATO armies into Eastern Europe was an appealing option until someone gamed it out and figured out that this strategy was not effective against a much larger Soviet army in Eastern Europe, categorizing it as suicide. Other strategies such as the early use of nuclear weapons, tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges, and horizontal escalation were eventually banished. After Proud Prophet, there was no more over-the-top nuclear rhetoric traced to the United States.
According to participant Paul Bracken, limited de-escalatory nuclear strikes were the most notable strategic proposal during Proud Prophet. The idea behind this strategy was that if Soviet authorities found that the West was about to go nuclear, they would come to their senses and accept a ceasefire. This was supposed to limit nuclear war. It did not play out that way. The team representing the Soviet Union interpreted limited nuclear strikes as an attack and threat on their nation, way of life, and honor. This led the team representing the Soviet Union to respond to the United States with an enormous nuclear salvo, which then led the United States to retaliate. The result was nothing less than a catastrophe.
In the book, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics, Paul Bracken claimed that Proud Prophet had a chastening and moderating impact on the Reagan's administration's rhetoric and thinking on nuclear war, but that was not all it did. According to Bracken's interpretation of Proud Prophet's outcome, the standard policies followed by chairman of the Joint Chiefs John William Vessey and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger inevitably led to an escalated conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.
During the game, their actions ultimately initiated a major nuclear war. Bracken claims that the result of Proud Prophet was a catastrophe, due to the numbers of individuals affected. Estimates made from the game showed half a billion human beings killed in initial exchanges, more than half a billion people dying subsequently from radiation and starvation and major parts of the Northern Hemisphere becoming uninhabitable, for decades.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs John William Vessey spent the next several years revitalizing and revamping the United States' war plans. Nuclear threats were gone and the new emphasis was focused on meeting Soviet conventional strength with the United States' conventional forces and following a long-term competitive strategy.
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